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Conventional banking institutions do not make loans to the poor,
especially to rural women. The bankers I met laughed at me.
-YUNus (1997)
After the bank's eighteen years in business, one could estimate
that conservatively half a million families were able to throw off a life
of destitution and begin living with a modicum of honor and dignity
as a result of intervention from the Grameen Bank.
-COUNTS (1996)
[T]he development community is riding the microcredit
band-wagon given that it is consistent with the dominant paradigm
of self-help, decentralization. . . and given that structural adjustment
programs have forced the poor into self-employment.
-McMICHAEL (2000)
A major source of the excitement surrounding microenterprise develop-
ment has been the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Ryan 1997; Brill 1999).
The statement by Mohammed Yunus, the bank's founder, describes his
struggle to offer microcredit in the 1970s. The second statement captures
the popular acclaim surrounding the bank and the hopes for future mi-
croenterprise development. Many U.S. MDPs were modeled after famous
southern programs such as the Grameen (Wahid 1993a; Counts 1996).
Despite praise for these programs, MDPs also have serious critics; the
third statement expresses the concern that MDPs direct too much atten-
tion toward individual self-help and distract from structural economic
conditions that promote and perpetuate poverty.
This chapter addresses one of my first questions as a microenterprise
development volunteer: Where did all these U.S. programs come from?
The answer that I typically received to this question was that U.S. MDPs
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were inspired by successful programs in developing countries. In other
words, the northern industrialized world had imported them from the
southern hemisphere-a unique turn of events given that development
programs have usually moved in the opposite geographical direction. Only
one U.S. provider told me that she started her program before she had
even heard of the famous Grameen Bank.
When I took a more in-depth look at microenterprise development his-
tory, I found that this south-to-north importation thesis was not the whole
story. The circumstances that led to the formation and spread of MDPs
were far more complex; they entailed the importation of ideas from north
to south as well as from south to north. Tracking the history and sources
of MDP innovations locates microenterprise development squarely within
the context of the conditions and policies of the new economy. An exam-
ination of the emergence and practice of southern MDPs reveals not only
program successes, but also fundamental contradictions in micro enter-
prise development.
CONTEXT OF MICROENTERPRISEDEVELOPMENT
MDPs were developed to extend business credit and training to the "poor-
est of the poor" in Mrica, Bangladesh, and Latin America (Microcredit
Summit 1997; Rogaly 1996). The decades of the 1970s and 1980s were
times of worldwide economic recession and government fiscal shortfalls.
In the 1980s and 1990s, modern MDPs became recognized as viable
mechanisms for dealing with some of the human economic tragedies of the
crises. MDP strategies were consistent with the neoliberal policy agendas
of minimal government and market-based solutions that also came to pre-
dominate during this period. These programs were to address the growing
problems of poverty and unemployment that continue to characterize life
in the new economy.
From the 1970s on, southern nations were faced with increasing debts
to industrialized countries that they could not repay. During the 1980s
and 1990s, international financial concerns and global financial regula-
tory agencies-such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The
World Bank-pressured the governments of southern nations to sharply
curtail spending, ease international trade regulations, and privatize
nationally owned banking institutions and industries (Jonakin and
Enriquez 1999; McMichael 2000). These requirements were consistent
with a neoliberal economic ideology of smaller government and the elim-
ination of trade restrictions. This neoliberal agenda, typically referred to
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as a structural adjustment policy, entailed massive layoffs of state workers
and the curtailing of social investment spending for education, health care,
and the like (Teeple 2000). The resulting withdrawal of many southern
hemisphere governments from the public sector has encouraged an in-
creased reliance on NGOs and community-based services for the poor
(Desai 2002).1
Even before recent globalization and structural adjustment regimes,
decades of export-oriented production had precipitated declines in small-
scale family-level agriculture oriented toward local consumption needs
(Roberts 1978; De Janvry 1981). Available credit and agricultural support
programs were oriented to larger-scale agribusiness farms. Impoverished
rural populations migrated to the cities in search of employment. Propo-
nents of structural adjustment policies predicted that the liberalization of
trade and financial markets and the expansion of private banking would
eventually counter the ill effects of shrinking state expenditures and loss
of jobs. However, continuing declines in agriculture and the resulting
migration to urban areas outstripped the formal employment opportuni-
ties there.
The jobs that became available in these areas failed to offer either im-
proved working conditions or economic security. Trade liberalization re-
quirements demanded that government minimize labor, environmental
regulations, local industry protections, and other barriers to international
trade. These rules limited worker pay and safety protections and promoted
barriers to collective organizing. Many new work opportunities entailed
more informal subcontracting work arrangements rather than permanent
employment. The constant global search for cheaper labor and the in~
creased mobility of work sites meant that even those limited employment
opportunities created by international trade might vanish at any time.
Although southern nations always maintained a large informal sector,
structural adjustment policies and the increasing decentralization of pro-
duction produced a population explosion of informal workers. Individu-
als engaged in the informal subcontracting of formal sector activities (e.g.,
in garment manufacturing) made up a large sector of this group, but many
also turned to more autonomous informal entrepreneurial ventures
(Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987; McMichael 2000; Agadjanian 2002).
Concerned about growing poverty and shrinking government re-
sources, development specialists began to advocate the extension of credit
to stimulate growth among small informal enterprises. They hoped rhat
such assistance would stabilize impoverished communities, and encourage
bottom-up economic development without expensive state-managed help
and employment programs (Wahid 1994; Yunus 1997).
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For-profit financial systems failed to deliver basic savings and credit to
low-income customers, small farms and other small businesses, especially
to women entrepreneurs (Light and Pham 1998). Banking services were
inconvenient and costly due to hefty service charges, minimum balance
requirements, and restricted withdrawal policies. Small consumer and
business loans (e.g., less than $25,000)2 were rarely offered because tradi-
tional banks claimed that these loans were too costly to administer (Yunus
1997). Individuals without sufficient collateral or with weak credit histo-
ries seldom received loans (Otero and Rhyne 1994). Thus, the poor typi-
cally relied on more costly informal financial services such as loan sharks.
Microfinance programs operated by nonprofit NGOs promised to fill
the gap in financial services to the poor (Otero and Rhyne 1994; Jonakin
and Enriquez 1999). Microfinance proponents argued that the failure of
the commercial banks to serve poverty-level clients prevented the poor
from accumulating assets. They associated the lack of assets with chronic
poverty and a sedimentation of disadvantage (Oliver and Shapiro 1995;
Yunus 1997). Microfinance services offered flexible checking, savings, and
lending options tailored to poor clientele. These services allowed smaller
minimum required balances, minimal service charges, and flexible with-
drawal options. Loans were typically for smaller amounts, offered more
flexible repayment options, and minimized collateral requirements. Some
programs were partially or completely owned by individual clients or by
their communities.
With their focus on training and lending to very small businesses,
MDPs can best be considered a subset of microfinance organizations.
However, some microfinance programs include MDP components and
some MDPs include savings and consumer-lending services. Unlike many
modern MDPs, especially those emerging in the United States, early micro-
finance organizations were more focused on lending and savings activities
than on business training, technical assistance, or collective empowerment
functions. Thus, microenterprise development activities are distinctive but
still related to other microfinance and development services. Several inno-
vations associated with modern MDPs were actually inspired by the prac-
tices of earlier microfinance groups.
EARLY MICROFINANCE ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
Although the past two decades have seen a rapid growth in microfinance
and microenterprise development services, such efforts are not entirely
new. Many modern MDPs resemble microlending and credit cooperatives
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developed in nineteenth-century Europe for small farmers, entrepreneurs,
and traders (Hollis and Sweetman 1998a, 1998b). Some programs were
charitable concerns; others operated for profit. There is also an extensive
history of lending programs aimed at small farmers in southern countries
that date to the early 1900s. These programs included direct loans, credit
cooperatives, specialized rural development banks, and regulations that
required banks to lend a portion of their loan portfolio to small farmers,
either directly or indirectly through development banks (Adams and Von
Pischke 1992). The loans made by development lending programs from
the 1950 through the 1980s were often subsidized by government agencies
or other NGOs. These loans were regarded as failures because many ended
in default and often ended up in the hands of prosperous rather than poor
farmers (Jonakin and Enriquez 1999). Defaults were blamed on generous
subsidies provided to lending organizations, subsidies that led them to op-
erate in an inefficient and unbusinesslike manner (Morduch 1999).
Many of these earlier lending programs have disappeared, but two
early forms of microfinance organizations remain popular around the
world. First, the most informal and perhaps longest lasting microfinance
organization form is the rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA).
ROSCAs are widespread in the southern hemisphere and popular among
some immigrant groups in industrialized nations (Laguerre 1998; Light
and Pham 1998). ROSCA members contribute a regular amount each
week or month, and group members take turns borrowing the money at
no interest. Because they are known and trusted by each other, ROSCA
members also provide social support for one another in consumption and
business pursuits. Their informality and resource requirements mean that
ROSCAs serve people with dependable incomes and social ties; they are
unlikely to serve the very poor or destitute.
A second traditional form of low-cost lending and savings services is
the credit union. Credit unions are cooperative financial institutions that
began in southern hemisphere countries in the 1950s and are popular in
industrialized nations (see Magil11994). Credit unions are legally consti-
tuted financial institutions that are, for the most part, chartered and su-
pervised under national cooperative legislation. They provide savings and
credit services to their members. Membership has traditionally been de-
fined in terms of some affiliation shared by all members (e.g., employment
or geography). Credit unions are organized and operated as cooperatives.
There are no external shareholders; the members are the owners of the in-
stitution, and each member has a vote in the organization. The policymak-
ing leadership is drawn from members and, in new or small credit unions,
these positions are unpaid. Individual credit unions may be affiliated with
24 . CHAPTER 1
a national league, and there are regional associations of leagues called
confederations. The apex organization for the credit union system is the
World Council of Credit Unions (Magill 1994 ).
Although both ROSCAs and credit unions have been significant in
offering savings and lending services to those who might not otherwise
have access, they tend to serve the poor who are better off. The ROSCA
form is limited in its scale and longevity of services. Although far less lim-
ited in scale and longevity, credit unions have not played a large role in mi-
croenterprise lending because their lending practices tend to be
conservative and they do not offer training and technical assistance. Nev-
ertheless, the modern MDP movement has built on the experiences of
these past microfinance programs to nurture a grassroots dimension that
enhances its popularity as a poverty-alleviation and economic develop-
ment strategy.
MODERN MDPs AS A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Microenterprise development is an important component in the reframing
of international development discourse (McMichael 2000; Poster and Sal-
ime 2002). Throughout much of the twentieth century, development poli-
cies were focused on large-scale, centrally planned ventures that usually
served the better-off people in southern countries (Visvanthan et al. 1997).
Many programs provided goods and services, especially modern technol-
ogy, to advance the development of poor countries. Historically, although
this development discourse adopted a gender-neutral stance, producers
were assumed to be men. Men received the direct benefits of development
programs, and women's productive roles were largely ignored. Programs
slowly integrated women into development concerns, but they were still
viewed as secondary (Escobar 1995; Parpart 1995).
During the 1970s, researchers and policymakers effectively challenged
the traditional development discourses of centralization and state-man-
aged interventions (Escobar 1995). These challenges were fueled by the re-
ported inefficiencies and failures of the top-down, or state-controlled,
development initiatives. Although some challenges came from leftist-ori-
ented groups, these attacks on government-provided development services
were compatible with neoliberal policies that aimed to shrink the size of
government and rely on a market-based production of all goods and serv-
ices. Such privatization ideologies were consistent with the identification
of the informal sector as an arena for low-cost and localized job creation
(McMichael 2000).
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The value of supporting self-employment as an economic development
strategy was first publicized in a 1972 study by the International Labor
Organization (ILO) in Nairobi, Kenya (Berger 1989; Raheim 1997). The
study analyzed the problem of unemployment among low-income urban
dwellers in southern countries. Findings indicated that although millions
of urban dwellers did not have formal employment, many of them-espe-
cially women-were engaged in productive self-employment in the infor-
mal or unregulated, and often unrecorded, sector of the economy (Tinker
1989). Subsequently, this ILO discovery of the informal sector emphasized
self-employment and women's role in it as a viable economic development
strategy. After the ILO report, multilateral and bilateral assistance agen-
cies devoted increasing attention to assisting women's enterprises in the in-
formal economic sectors (Berger 1989; Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987;
Portes 1997). Experts (e.g., Ashe 1985; Auwal and Singhal 1996) argued
that giving credit to the self-employed poor would stimulate economic
growth and ameliorate the unequal distribution of assets (i.e., wealth).
Over the past two decades, the promotion of self-employment has be-
come the dominant model for assisting women in the southern hemisphere
(Poster and Salime 2002). Again, consistent with the structural adjustment
ideology, attention moved away from structural economic problems and
toward the privatization of public services and the development of women
as individuals. The discourse shifted from a focus on "development as
charity" to a view of "development as business" (McMichael 2000, 295).
Microenterprise development is applauded as a southern hemisphere in-
vention that was later copied or borrowed by programs in northern hemi-
sphere countries (Coyle et al. 1994). However, such characterizations lose
sight of the extent to which northern hemisphere-dominated governmen-
tal and nongovernmental organizations shaped the form and popularity of
many of these programs. Organizations such as the Ford Foundation,
United Nations Development Program, and, more recently, World Bank
have been instrumental in defining the standards and funding parameters
for southern MDPs (Prugl1996; Alvarez 1999; McMichael 2000).
U.S. Agency for International Development Programs
In 1978, USAID sponsored the Program for Investment in the Small Cap-
ital Enterprise Sector (PISCES) in sixteen countries in Africa, Asia, and
Latin American (Ashe 1985). PISCES analyzed the factors that shaped the
SUccessof microenterprises operated by the urban poor in these countries
and also conducted demonstration projects to provide technical and
financial assistance to microenterprises in four countries: Costa Rica,
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Dominican Republic, Egypt, and Kenya (Ashe 1985). PISCES concluded
that, by allowing the poor to develop their own plans for business, mi-
croenterprise offers significant social welfare and economic development
benefits. The final report recommended a more decentralized approach
that funded local intermediary organizations to support and assist mi-
croenterprises.
USAID next created the Assistance to Resources Institutions for Enter-
prise Support Project (ARIES) in 1985. ARIES provided management and
technical assistance to intermediary agencies to enhance their capacity to
serve microenterprises. These intermediaries included government agen-
cies, private voluntary organizations, banks, business associations, and co-
operatives (Balkin 1989).
More recently, USAID has hosted conferences aimed at the global dis-
semination of information about microenterprise development. For exam-
ple, in 1999 USAID hosted the Second Annual International Women's
Business Conference in Chicago. The conference was part of the USAID's
Lessons without Borders, a project aimed at promoting the international
exchange between policy planners and community activists about success-
ful development strategies. The keynote presentations emphasized that re-
stricted access to credit was a significant problem for third-world women
and microcredit was portrayed as the best modern development strategy
for empowering women (Poster and Salime 2002, 198-201).
In .addition to USAID, other United Nations agencies as well as the
Inter-American Development Bank and other donor groups sponsored pi-
oneering lending programs in Latin American, Indonesia, India, and
Bangladesh (Berger 1989). These lending programs began making loans
and other assistance to microenterprises in the mid-1970s. Although ini-
tially resistant to the micro enterprise development concept (see Yunus
1997), the World Bank began to sign on to MDP projects by the mid-
1990s (Buckley 2002). In 1995, the World Bank established the Consulta-
tive Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), an organization dedicated to
expanding the funding and outreach for microfinance organizations. Con-
sistent with the neoliberal orientation of the World Bank, this group's
mandate was to fund programs to aid the poor who are or can become fi-
nancially self-sufficient (Buckley 2002, 113-14).
In 1997, the first Microcredit Summit convened in Washington D.C.
The Summit's Declaration and Plan of Action defines the group as an as-
sembly whose purpose is "to launch a global movement to reach 100 mil-
lion of the world's poorest families, especially the women of those
families, with credit for self-employment and other financial and business
services, by the year 2005" (MICRO Loan Fund n.d.).
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A second Microcredit Summit was held in New York City in fall 2002;
delegates from one hundred countries attended. The United Nations has
declared 2005 to be the International Year of Microcredit. The resolution
requests that the observance of the year be a special occasion for encour-
aging microcredit programs throughout the world. The Microcredit Sum-
mit Campaign is meeting with UN officials to help coordinate events for
2005 (MICRO Loan Fund n.d.).
The innovations associated with pioneering MDP programs have been
integral to framing the need for micro enterprise development today. Spe-
cific program practices vary, but these innovations are common enough
across programs to merit review.
INNOVATIVE MICROENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM METHODS
The historical economic context just described is important for under-
standing the process of micro enterprise development. Modern MDPs de-
veloped innovative methods for extending credit to the poor. Some of
these innovations were modifications of predecessor programs described
above. Modern innovations attempt to remedy problems that plagued past
economic development and microfinance programs.
1. Focus on women clients. In the past two decades, most MDPs in
southern countries have targeted women, and anywhere from 50 to 100
percent of their clients are women. This trend has occurred for several rea-
sons. Feminists have criticized past development practices for excluding
women or ignoring their economic responsibilities. This neglect of women
is especially problematic because of a worldwide trend toward the femi-
nization of poverty-70 percent of the world's poor are women. Women
are disadvantaged economically because of their limited access to educa-
tion, formal jobs, and resources such as land and credit, and in many na-
tions women are deprived of fundamental economic, political, and human
rights (see Desai 2002). Moreover, most victims of poverty are children
who reside in mother-headed households, a situation that is of an even
greater concern becanse a growing percentage of honseholds are female-
headed. Microenterprise development is seen as a possible corrective to
the situation.
Working women in southern nations are disproportionately located in
self-employment activities in informal sectors (Creevey 1996). A number
of studies suggest that women invest more of their income in their fami-
lies-for food, school, and shelter-than do men {Amin, Becker, and
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Bayes 1998; Auwal and Singhal 1992), and some studies report that
women repay their loans more reliably than men (Pitt and Khandker
1998; Blumberg 1995,2001). Programs such as the Grameen Bank even
incorporate explicitly antipatriarchal and pro-development ideologies.
2. Peer lending model. The peer-lending model (also referred to as bor-
rowers' circles or solidarity groups) is a method of micro enterprise devel-
opment that adapts elements of the ROSCA model. As with ROSCAs,
group cooperation and support are integral to success. In peer lending,
three to ten microentrepreneurs join together to receive a loan or related
services such as business training, social services, and organization build-
ing. Group members collectively guarantee loan repayment, and access to
subsequent loans is dependent on successful repayment by all members.
Loans are determined by borrower need, loan size, purpose, and terms.
The peer group serves as a mechanism for loan administration, social sup-
port, community building, information exchange, and pressure for loan
repayment. It is credited with increasing the repayment rate of very poor
individuals with little or no collateral and weak credit histories (Beren-
bach and Guzman 1994). Peer lending is also praised for building net-
works, that is social capital, among the poor (Woolcock 1998).
3. Step lending. Another program innovation is graduated or step
lending. Individuals starting new businesses or those with poor credit and
a lack of collateral may build up to larger loans by establishing a good re-
payment history on small loans. Savings requirements may be a compo-
nent of the step-lending process. This innovation allows MDPs to
minimize their losses on high-risk loans. It also allows entrepreneurs time
to develop their businesses and establish a pattern of savings before as-
suming larger loans (Himes and Servon 1998).
4. Local relevance. MDPs try to be responsive to their local situation.
This innovation is a direct response to large-scale economic development
programs of the past that were designed by and often for some other pop-
ulation and simply transplanted to a locality without concern for the
uniqueness of that setting (Tinker 1999; Prugl and Tinker 1997; Visvan-
than et al. 1997). Many MDPs are locally based NGOs. NGO forms have
been praised as a type of third-way alternative to private- and state-sector
solutions to social and economic problems. They promise to be less bu-
reaucratic than government, more socially conscious than for-profit firms,
and more responsive to local community needs (Giddens 1998; Schreiner
and Morduch 2002).
INTERNATIONAL ROOTS. 29
5. Collective Organization and Empowerment. Although the sheer
provision of micro finance services and micro enterprise development to the
poor is viewed as a path to the economic and social empowerment of in-
dividuals, many MDPs in southern countries adopt far more comprehen-
sive agendas. They include extensive educational, health-care, or
community economic development projects such as water or irrigation
systems (see Self-Employed Women's Association [SEWA] n.d.). Several
programs are client-owned and controlled (e.g., FINCA), and some ac-
tively organize clients at the occupational or community levels (e.g., into
unions or collective buying and marketing groups). Collective organizing
is responsive to the demands for local relevance because programs that are
locally controlled are more likely to be locally relevant.
6. The Village Bank Model. Village banks are another innovative
method for delivering microfinance services and microenterprise develop-
ment. Village banks are community-managed credit and savings associa-
tions (see Hatch and Hatch 1989; Holt 1994). The concept borrows from
the credit union model described earlier, but village banks aim for a
greater presence in micro enterprise development and community invest-
ment strategies. The village bank model may include any or all of the pro-
gram innovations previously described-peer lending, a focus on women
clients, stepped lending, and community organization. The financial oper-
ation of village banks begins when sponsoring agencies lend seed capital
to newly established village banks, which then lend to their members. All
members sign the loan agreement as a collective guarantee. First loans are
typically small and short-term. The bank charges a commercial rate of in-
terest. At the end of sixteen weeks, the bank repays the sponsoring agency
with interest. When members repay their first loan on time, they can get a
second loan, the amount of which is determined by the savings a member
has accumulated through weekly contributions during the first loan pe-
riod. Members' savings stay in the village bank and are used to finance
new loans or collective income-generating activities. No interest is paid on
savings; instead, members receive a share of profits from the village bank's
relending activities and other investments.
7. Bridge Lending. Recently, some MDPs have developed mechanisms
to aid the transformation of larger micro enterprises into small businesses
through training and longer-term loans of $3,000 or more (Reed and Befus
1994). Bridge lending responds to microenterprises that are too large for
most MDP loans but too small to meet minimum loan amounts or collat-
eral requirements in traditional banks. The loans assist the enterprise in
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hiring employees, increasing production, or moving into markets with
higher-technology requirements.
PROMINENT MICROENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
The MDPs that have been the most influential in U.S. microenterprise de-
velopment have tended to be the older and larger programs such as AC-
CION International and, most prominent of all, the Grameen Bank.
ACCION International is an umbrella organization for affiliated mi-
crolending organizations and banks around the world. The Grameen Bank
is a lending institution with numerous branches. It pioneered many ele-
ments of the village bank methodology. FINCA was established later than
other programs, but has applied the village bank model around the world.
Perhaps less well known in the United States, but nevertheless an impor-
tant inspiration for many feminist-oriented U.S. MDPs, is SEWA. This
program was developed by women and offered some of the earliest south-
ern MDP services. It is distinguished by its direct organizing and compre-
hensive collective empowerment agenda. The next sections move from the
most holistic to the more narrow models of southern MDP development.
Self-Employed Women's Association
SEWA {India} describes itself as an organization developed "by women for
women" {SEWA n.d.}.lt has a comprehensive focus on women's social
and economic development and collective empowerment. Although credit
is an important SEWA goal, the organization's concerns extend well be-
yond business training or credit. The organization was founded by a
charismatic leader, Ela Bhatt, a lawyer and labor organizer in India.
Through its organizations, SEWA aims to empower the growing sector of
contingent workers that characterize the new economy.
SEWA was established in 1972 as a trade union for women engaged in
informal-sector enterprises. Most of these women were home-based and,
as informal-sector workers, were not allowed to affiliate with established
trade unions. Women in India were typically denied access to formal-
sector employment and were highly exploited by the middlemen who sub-
contracted work to them or marketed their goods. Bhatt found some of
these women living in the street without shelter. Their enterprises included
work as street vendors, home textile workers, dairy farmers, and cart
pullers. SEWA workers' cooperatives, or unions, help members negotiate
with the middlemen, contractors, and merchants who use their services.
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SEWA cooperatives represent many different occupational groups and
boast over 2 million members (Desai 2002).
SEWA addresses members' credit needs through a village bank model.
After serving as a financial intermediary between its members and lending
institutions for several years, it established its own cooperative bank in
1974. The bank's membership is restricted to poor women, and it aims to
help them become financially independent in their own enterprises. Self-
employed women as shareholders own the bank, and their elected board
makes the policies. The board hires professional managers to run the
bank. As of 1999, SEWA Bank had approximately 93,000 active deposi-
tors, and over 33,000 loans outstanding. It has disbursed the equivalent of
over $13 million in loans. The bank borrows and lends at market rates of
interest (approximately 4 percent) and provides loans with a repayment
period of three years. Loans under the equivalent of $55 require one guar-
antor; those above this amount require two. The maximum loan amount
is the equivalent of approximately $700. Most loans are made directly to
individuals, but SEWA uses the peer-lending model in rural areas. Loans
are made for working capital, that is, for buying tools or for capital in-
vestments, such as a house, store, or work space. All borrowers are re-
quired to save. The bank reports that it is fully self-supporting and is not
subsidized. It reports an average loan repayment rate of 95 percent.
SEWA Bank works closely with the SEWA trade union to provide ad-
ditional services to members, include training in banking procedures,
housing loans, and insurance. SEWA actively promotes collective empow-
erment through its labor cooperatives, which are involved in the provision
of health care, child care, literacy, video technology, and community lead-
ership training (SEWA n.d.). It is similar to the Working Women's Forum
(WWF), an organization developed in Madras, India (Working Women's
Forum [WWF] n.d.). Both SEWA and the WWF organize women infor-
mal-sector workers. Both have inspired some U.S. practitioners to design
MDPs especially geared toward the needs of women.
Grameen Bank
The Grameen Bank is the prototype for the global MDP movement. It has
been the subject of books, films, and television coverage and its founder
has assumed an almost cultlike status as a leader of the field (Counts
1996; Brill 1999). The program has inspired numerous replications
around the world including several U.S. programs. Like SEWA, the
Grameen Bank was founded by a charismatic leader indigenous to the
area that the program served. Also like SEWA, the Grameen Bank has a
32 . CHAPTER 1
fairly holistic development agenda. However, this agenda does not entail
. . .
umon orgamzmg.
Mohammed Yunus was a native of Bangladesh and professor of Eco-
nomics at the University of Chittagong. His concern with rural poverty al-
leviation was heightened by the 1973-1974 Bangladeshi famine that killed
several hundred thousand Bangladeshis (Auwal and Singhal 1992). The
bank began as an experimental project in 1976 and turned into a formal
nonprofit financial institution in 1983. Its purpose was to provide credit
to poor, landless men and women. Yunus defined the poor as those who
cultivated less than one-half acre of land or possessed assets worth less
than the value of one acre of medium-quality cultivated land (Counts
1996, 46). Grameen loans were targeted to poor rural women because
Yunus believed that women were more responsible savers and investors in
family needs than were men (Auwal and Singhal 1992; Mizan 1993).
Yunus's targeting of women was especially significant because women's
rights were so limited in Bangladesh: they faced Muslim rules of seclusion
for women and were typically denied access to formal-sector wage labor
(Creevey 1996). Yunus described their only borrowing options as loan
sharks who charged exorbitant rates of interest. He argued that credit was
a "fundamental human right" and that it could provide the poor with ac-
cess to other human rights such as food, shelter, and health care (Counts
1996; Bornstein 1996).
The Grameen Bank operates by setting up a bank unit (or branch) with
a field manager and several staff to cover fifteen to twenty-two villages.
The manager and workers visit villages to recruit clientele and learn about
the local milieu. Groups of prospective borrowers are formed, and, in this
first stage, two members are eligible to borrow. The group is observed for
a month to see if its members are conforming to bank rules. If after five
weeks the two members have repaid their loans with interest, other mem-
bers may borrow. The average loan size is $160 and the interest is approx-
imately 20 percent. Five percent of each loan is paid into the Group Fund.
Members must also make weekly payments of 1 taka (or approximately 3
cents) into the Group Fund. This fund belongs to the group, which deter-
mines how it will be used. In addition, members pay approximately 25
percent of their total interest payment into an Emergency Fund, which
serves as life and accident insurance for members (Grameen Bank n.d.).
The groups meet weekly in the village with their bank assistant to dis-
cuss loan requests and any other matter of interest. Grameen staff provide
comprehensive investment counseling and close supervision over borrow-
ers' entrepreneurial activities to help improve their productivity and prof-
itability. The peer-lending process aims to create a collective identity for
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the group. Each group elects officers and the branch elects a chief and
deputy chief. The officers serve for one year and may not be reelected until
others who are eligible have had the opportunity to serve in a leadership
position. The Grameen Bank also requires that its borrowers generate sav-
ings in order to buy the bank's shares. This gives members ownership in
the bank. Members elect representatives to serve on nine of the twelve
available seats on the Grameen's board of directors (Auwal and Singhal
1992; Bornstein 1996).
Grameen leaders hope that the very existence of the organized borrow-
ers' groups and centers will help members acquire the self-confidence,
skills, and awareness to undertake other community actions (Wahid 1994;
Bornstein 1996). Borrowers participate in decision making about the
Grameen's practices during annual national workshops. For example, in
one workshop, participants helped to formulate the Sixteen Decisions, a
social contract that all members now recite at their meetings. The slogans
include vows to eat nutritious food, educate children, and drink safe
water; members also disavow domestic abuse and the practice of dowry
(Solomon 1992). Through this contract, the bank seeks to undermine gen-
der inequities and promote economic development. Accordingly, the
Grameen Bank and this contract have stirred hostility among religious
fundamentalist groups in Bangladesh, who resent what they regard as a
Western influence (Goetz and Gupta 1996).
Because it became a formal bank, the Grameen Bank has made nearly
16 million loans, totaling over $3 billion. In 2002, the Grameen Bank had
over 1,000 branches, had over 2 million members, employed 11,000 staff
and worked in 41,000 villages of Bangladesh. There have been more than
170 Grameen Bank replications in more than forty countries (Grameen
Bank n.d.).
The Grameen Bank reports a repayment rate of 98 percent, which is
higher than the repayment rate of most traditional institutions in Bangla-
desh (Wahid 1994). The Grameen Bank attributes its high repayment
record to its peer-lending model and to the use of the group's emergency
fund to cover members' missed payments (Grameen Bank n.d.).
The Grameen Bank now operates as a for-profit institution. However,
the bank is actually part of a family of institutions that includes other for-
profit concerns and several nonprofit programs. With assistance from pri-
vate donations, branch banks sponsor workshops for members to increase
their knowledge of and commitment to improved health, contraceptive, and
educational practices (Holcombe 1995). The bank family of programs also
includes research and development projects that experiment with new tech-
nologies for increasing production, collective marketing of local products,
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and building infrastructure support for local businesses and communities
(e.g., sanitation and water purification). These programs typically require
additional funding from outside sources (Grameen Bank n.d.).
Foundation for International Community Assistance
FINCA is a nonprofit agency that began in Costa Rica in 1984. FINCA
aims to alleviate poverty by developing banks in small communities that
offer small loans and savings opportunities to low-income families.
FINCA groups lend primarily to women.
Like women in Bangladesh and India, women in Costa Rica and other
parts of Latin America are disproportionately relegated to work in the in-
formal sectors. Although not facing the degree of religious-based restric-
tions encountered by Indian and Bangladeshi women, Latin American
women still suffer from educational and economic disadvantages vis-a.-vis
men. Moreover, many Latin American men and women live in countries
damaged by civil war, paramilitary rule, and ,an extreme polarization of
wealth.
The FINCA organization pioneered the village bank method and is con-
sidered a leader in the microfinance field. FINCA coordinates a network
of affiliates serving nineteen countries in Africa, Asia, and the Americas,
including MDPs in the United States (Foundation for International Com-
munity Assistance [FINCA] n.d.).
The origins of FINCA are more directly linked to the United States than
those of SEWA and the Grameen Bank. FINCA was founded by a U.S.
economist, John Hatch, who had twenty years of experience in the inter-
national development field. Much of its funding comes from USAID
(FINCA n.d.). Although its approach is less comprehensive than that of
SEWA and the Grameen Bank, FINCA gives its participants the responsi-
bility for running their bank and reinvesting its assets in their communities
(Holt 1994). FINCA is also noted for encouraging savings, a microfinance
service that is often underemphasized in other programs (Holt 1994). Its
programs serve over 150,000 borrowers in over 8,000 groups.
FINCA Village Banks are support groups of ten to thirty-five members,
mostly women, who meet weekly or biweekly to access small self-employ-
ment loans to start or expand their businesses. These groups provide
structured savings programs and a community-based support system.
FINCA borrowers receive loans so that they can buy rice in bulk at whole-
sale prices and resell it at retail prices; buy a used refrigerator to keep pro-
duce fresh; or purchase a sewing machine instead of stitching by hand.
The aim of these loans is to make borrowers more productive so that they
INTERNATIONAL ROOTS. 35
can increase their income and accumulate savings for other investments
and emergencies. The groups guarantee one another's loans ranging from
$50 to $500. Group loan guarantees substitute for traditional collateral.
Like the Grameen Bank, meetings are participatory; members elect lead-
ers, design bylaws, and manage funds and loans, including enforcing
penalties for noncompliance. FINCA also provides technical assistance to
groups. FINCA reports an overall loan repayment rate of 96 percent. In-
terest is approximately 3-4 percent per month. Sixty-five percent of
FINCA's funding comes from the USAID, and the rest is from private
foundations, corporations, and individual donors. The organization aims
to help all FINCA country programs to become self-sufficient; some pro-
grams claim to be nearly self-sufficient, covering almost 91 percent of
their in-country operating costs (FINCA n.d.).
Americans for Community Cooperation in Other Nations
ACCION International is a private, nonprofit organization that serves as
an umbrella agency for a network of microfinance institutions in fifteen
countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the United States.
The organization was founded in 1961 in Caracas, Venezuela, by a group
of U.S. students and volunteers. Their aim was to help poor communities
to address pressing needs. At the outset, U.S.-based multinational corpo-
rations funded ACCION projects to improve the neighborhoods near their
corporate offices. Later, ACCION leaders decided that the best mecha-
nism for fostering political and economic development in Latin America
was through assistance to informal sector workers. In 1973, ACCION
shifted its attention to individual businesses and began to provide credit
and training to the self-employed poor. It developed a peer-lending ap-
proach called solidarity lending (Servon 1999a; Himes and Servon 1998;
ACCION International 2003). ACCION is the most narrowly focused of
the four programs discussed here; it concentrates on lending to microen-
trepreneurs, and only minimal training and technical assistance accom-
pany its loans.
ACCION targets borrowers who are self-employed and who rely on
micro enterprise as their main income source. ACCION reports that its
clients are among the nation's poor at the time of their first loan, usually
have no collateral, may not be able to read or write, and may not have
enough collateral to open for business every day. They include market
vendors, sandalmakers, and seamstresses. Women are 65 percent of
ACCION's southern hemisphere clients (Himes and Servon 1998;
ACCION International 2003).
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The ACCION network provides small short-term loans at interest rates
that reflect the cost of lending. Borrowers may. apply for loans individu-
ally, but, if they lack physical collateral or a cosigner, they join with other
borrowers to form solidarity groups (i.e., borrowers' circles). The first
loans are small, as low as $100. Borrowers who repay on time are eligible
for increasingly larger step loans. As of 2002, ACCION's average loan
ranged from approximately $300 to $500 in Latin America and Africa, to
almost $6,000 in the United States. It serves approximately 2.7 million
clients and has disbursed the equivalent of $4.6 billion dollars with a re-
ported repayment rate of 97 percent (ACCION International 2003).
ACCION prioritizes program self-sufficiency, and this goal, at least in
part, explains its more narrowly focused strategies. Programs control op-
eration costs by keeping training costs low. Required training is minimal,
including only ten hours of classes that are structured through training
notebooks and focused on lending groups and the lending process. A sec-
ond, optional tier of training responds to requests from group members
and includes management techniques appropriate to microenterprises
(e.g., marketing and increasing profits). Technical assistance in the form of
one-on-one counseling follows training sessions (Berenbach and Guzman
1994). ACCION's self-sufficiency goals necessitate that fees be attached to
all program services. The organization argues that these prices provide a
good indirect measure of training success by indicating the value of AC-
CION training to clients (ACCION International 2003).
Although funding comes from both public and private sources (e.g.,
grants from Citicorp Foundation, Ford Foundation, and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Treasury), ACCION leaders doubt that there will ever be enough
charitable monies for MDPs to have a significant impact on poverty. Thus,
ACCION has designed its program in a manner consistent with new pri-
vatization trends; it attempts to model itself as a business. ACCION aims
to become self-supporting and eventually to become commercial by in-
creasing its loan volume, borrower interest, and associated loan and tech-
nicalassistance fees. ACCION leaders believe efficiently managed MDPs
can generate more income than they spend. Once commercially viable,
these programs can become financial institutions and can access the inter-
national capital markets by issuing their own debt instruments, most typ-
ically as certificates of deposit or as bonds. ACCION publishes reports on
best practices in an effort to help microlenders worldwide move toward fi-
nancial sustainability (ACCION International 2003).
Some ACCION affiliates have reached commercial viability, been in-
corporated into their country's financial system as regulated institutions,
and offer savings and other financial services to microenterprise clients
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(Christen and Drake 2002). ACCION played a key role in the creation of
commercial micro finance institutions such as BancoSol in Bolivia,
Mibanco in Peru, and Finamerica in Columbia (ACCION International
2003; Rhyne 2001). BancoSol was the world's first commercial bank ded-
icated to microenterprise lending (Gonzales-Vega et al. 1997). ACCION
has inspired the design of several u.s. MDPs and, beginning in 1991,
formed affiliates in more than thirty U.S. cities.
European Programs
Although the inspiration for microenterprise development is typically
associated with the poverty and economic crises of southern hemisphere
nations, some European programs have also served to inform the microen-
terprise field. However, in contrast to southern nation MDPs, these pro-
grams have focused more narrowly on assistance to the unemployed. In
1980, the Chomeurs Createurs (Unemployed Entrepreneurs) enabled
French citizens entitled to unemployment compensation to collect benefits
in a lump sum to finance creating a small business (Balkin 1989). If the
business failed, the individual could receive benefits again, but was re-
quired to repay the loss through higher unemployment insurance once he
or she secured another job. In 1983, Britain introduced the Enterprise Al-
lowance Scheme (EAS), a program wherein unemployed people were eli-
gible for technical assistance to start their own businesses. Recipients
received allowances, roughly equivalent to unemployment benefit
amounts, that extended for up to one year (Balkin 1989).
SOUTHERNMDP SUCCESSES
The positive evaluations of pioneering MDPs encouraged the spread of
these program innovations to other southern regions and to northern
hemisphere countries (Gibbs 1990; Katz 1991; Schuman 1993). Evalua-
tions reported significant succes'ses in the areas of (1) poverty alleviation
through self-subsistence, (2) economic development, (3) individual em-
powerment, and (4) collective empowerment through community organi-
zation. Many programs also reported successes in achieving or moving
toward program sustainability.
In terms of poverty alleviation and economic development, many re-
searchers associate MDPs with increased participant incomes and in-
creased numbers of jobs in regions where programs operate. For example,
one study of the Grameen Bank compared wage levels in villages served
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by the bank with a control group of villages that lacked a Grameen cen-
ter. The researchers found a significantly higher wage level in the bank vil-
lages and concluded that economic activity fueled by Grameen credit had
tightened the labor market and increased labor income (Khandker,
Khalily, and Khan 1995). An interview study with 380 FINCA Village
Bank borrowers in EI Salvador revealed that their weekly incomes in-
creased an average of 145 percent (Hahn and Ganuzza n.d.). Participant
savings also increased significantly over time. One ACCION study found
that family income increased at an average rate of 30 percent after a series
of small loans (Himes and Servon 1998). Proponents rely on such research
to associate microlending activities with job creation and client improve-
ments in agricultural productivity, housing quality, income, and nutrition
(Microcredit Summit 1997).
Some researchers emphasize the role of MDPs in empowering clients as
individuals. Participation in peer-lending groups is associated with in-
creases in confidence and self-esteem. Microenterprise development also
may indirectly promote empowerment through inclusion in the economic
system, improved health, education, greater input into household decision
making, and less dependency on wealthy landlords or loan sharks
(Naidoo 1994; Auwal and Singhal 1992; Rahman 1994; Rahman and
Wahid 1992). The Grameen Bank's pro-development stance and its re-
quirement that members must accept the Sixteen Decisions are cited as an
important source of empowerment for women (e.g., vows to educate chil-
dren and to disavow domestic abuse and the practice of dowry) (Auwal
and Singhal 1992).
MDPs claim significant success in the realm of collective empowerment
(i.e., community organizing) (Desai 2002). Union-focused organizations
such as SEWA report a direct impact on women's income and working
conditions through collective bargaining (Bhatt 1995; Rose 1996). In-
volvement in village banking or borrowers' circles is also associated with
increasing women's awareness, participation in community organization,
and community action (Naidoo 1994; Creevey 1996).
Some MDPs emphasize their potential to be self-sufficient programs.
SEWA, ACCION, and the Grameen Bank cite low default rates and signif-
icant participant savings accumulation as important steps in their move
toward institutional self-sufficiency. Others argue that microfinance is be-
coming more commercialized in the southern hemisphere, most notably in
Latin American countries (Christen and Drake 2002). This trend is exem-
plified by NGOs that are transforming into licensed banks in order to ac-
cess public funds or smalJ savings deposits. In addition, banks and finance
companies are exploring methods for offering micro lending and savings
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services to the poor (Christen and Drake 2002). Consistent with a neolib-
eral emphasis on market-based solutions to social problems, a number of
proponents argue that commercialization is an essential and viable step
for MDP institutionalization and growth.
CRITICISMS OF MICROENTERPRISEDEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Evaluations-Methodological Concerns
Although positive evaluations support MDP success claims and funding
requests, such reports are not without critics. The debates about MDP
evaluations also provide insights into the dilemmas surrounding diffusion
and further development in the MDP organizational field.
Many evaluations rely only on indirect measures of program success
(i.e., proxies) to avoid costly client follow-ups. Proxies include the num-
ber of clients served, number of loans made, and rates of loan repayment
as success indicators. More direct measures of success would include in-
creases in client incomes, number of clients' business employees, and value
of business assets after program involvement (Berger 1989). The duration
of client follow-ups and the representativeness of follow-up samples are
also important issues. A brief follow-up cannot assess the longevity of
client businesses or long-term improvements in client incomes. On the
other hand, longer follow-ups heighten the risk of sample bias as clients
drop out or lose touch with programs over time. Such sample mortality is
problematic because the least successful clients are those most likely to
lose touch with the program.
Even studies that include direct measures and long-term follow-ups
often fail to incorporate an adequate comparison group of non-MDP
clients (Gulli 1998). Without good comparison groups, it is uncertain
whether observed improvements are the result of MDP participation. Ob-
served client outcomes might be the result of other unmeasured factors
such as a general improvement in the economy or client resources that are
unrelated to MDPs. Studies that examine the regional impact of MDPs are
especially vulnerable to this type of error (Schreiner 1999b).
Research that addresses these methodological concerns is needed to in-
form future funding and diffusion of MDPs (Morduch 1999,2000). How-
ever, strong evaluation designs are difficult to achieve. The introduction of
proper comparison groups (who would be eligible for but do not receive
services) can raise ethical concerns. Sound evaluations can be expensive
and divert funds from important program services. Moreover, funders
seem more interested in analyzing programs' potential for self-sufficiency
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than in rigorous assessments of impacts on poverty alleviation (Morduch
2000; Buckley 2002).
Other Issues
In addition to these methodological concerns, experts challenge the inter-
national MDP movement on other grounds. Some argue that MDPs legit-
imate structUral adjustment policies that increase unemployment and
restrict state responsibilities for social investment in the poor (S. Johnson
1998; Desai 2002). They challenge claims that individuals can lift them-
selves out of poverty with hard work and a little MDP credit or training
(Rogaly 1996). Critics question the capability of most microenterprises to
provide a livable income for families; the businesses are typically in sectors
that are vulnerable to large-scale corporate competitors and cheap import
policies (e.g., food production) (Grosh and Somolekae 1996). Some re-
search suggests that MDP loans are used to meet daily consumption rather
than commercial needs (Goetz and Gupta 1996; Singh and Wysham
1997). Many argue that in the absence of structural economic changes to
promote a positive regulatory and economic environment for microenter-
prises, MDPs may simply increase indebtedness among the poor (Berger
1989; Adams and Von Pische 1992; Carr 1995). "It is only a short leap in
argument from reports of a very large number of women borrowers and
high repayment rates to promotion of financial services as an answer to
poverty and the needs of the very poorest. . . . [Q]uite clearly, financial
services are not always the most appropriate intervention. There may be
much more urgent requirements, such as health and education services"
(Rogaly 1996, 105).
Critics argue that despite expressed aims, MDPs fail to reach a suffi-
cient number of poor people (Hulme and Mosley 1996; Morduch 1999,
2000); many MDPs have a high percentage of nonpoor clients (Gulli 1998,
ix). Even the Grameen Bank, which has one of the best records for serving
those in poverty, reports that it is unable to reach the poorest 10 percent
of its population (Coyle et al. 1994). Some scholars also question whether
the better-off of the poor really need MDPs to succeed (Morduch 2000).
Analysts argue that even when MDPs reach poor clients, programs are
usually too small to attain the same scale as banks and credit unions that
may serve smaller percentages but serve larger absolute numbers of the
poor (Gulli 1998; Buckley 2002). Although it might increase the number
of clients served, commercialization might also reduce outreach to the
poor or certainly minimize the support services that can be offered at a
profit (hence the use of the term commercial microfinance instead of
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microenterprise development) (Hulme and Mosley 1996; Morduch 1999).
Along such lines, some experts argue that MDPs should aim for sustain-
ability rather than self-sufficiency. Sustainability means that programs are
cost-effective in that (1) their operating costs are clearly outweighed by
their program impact and (2) their programs can be sustained by smaller
amounts of outside funds (Otero and Rhyne 1994; Hulme and Mosley
1996; Gulli 1998).
Even if the majority of MDPs remain nonprofit or government pro-
viders, the new privatization ideology of businesslike cost effectiveness is
likely to pervade the entire MDP organizational field. Commercialization
proponents acknowledge that the movement of a few private firms into
the MDP industry will shape the conduct of all-profit, governmental,
and nonprofit alike. The line between commercial and nonprofit organi-
zations is further blurred by observations that the largest investors in com-
mercial micro finance concerns are public development agencies and
nonprofits (Christen and Drake 2002). Many nonprofits, in turn, are
funded by grants from private firms and government (Smith and Lipsky
1993). The hegemony of market standards combined with complex inter-
weaving of links among government, nonprofit and for-profit organiza-
tions heighten the ambiguity of responsibilities and accountability for
social services (Jurik 2004).
Increasingly, many practitioners and scholars argue that there is a fun-
damental contradiction between program outreach and sustainability
goals (Hulme and Mosley 1996; Morduch 1999,2000; Vinelli 2002). In-
tensive social and economic support are important for reaching poor
clients, but these services greatly increase program operating costs. In-
creased costs, in turn, undermine MDP sustainability and self-sufficiency.
Sustainability desires may converge with demands for successful program
outcomes to pressure staff to screen out higher-risk borrowers. Such
"creaming" processes may exclude those who are the most lauded targets
for MDP services-women and the poor (Blumberg 1995; Kidder 1998).
Although the MDP focus on women has been highly praised for em-
powering women economically and socially, critics argue that emphasiz-
ing women clients to the exclusion of men can heighten women's burden
as providers for the family and discourage men's responsibility. Moreover,
directing attention to individual women as entrepreneurs distracts from
the structural sources of gender inequality (Poster and Salime 2002).
Some case studies challenge claims that localized programs automati-
cally lead to collective empowerment. Funding controls and performance
standards set by multinational development organizations often thwart
local organizing and other collective empowerment agendas by women.
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Local community organizing activities can be inhibited by the demands of
international and regional funding sources, and the programs favored by
many large funding sources adopt a narrow, more technical and business-
oriented approach to microenterprise development (Lang 1997; Poster
and Salime 2002).
Centralized controls and bureaucratic regulations may limit program
responsiveness to the concrete needs of clients. The resulting rules for pro-
gram operations can be irrelevant or dysfunctional for clients in some lo-
calities (Prug11996; Alvarez 1999; McMichael 2000.) For example, some
women found that rules for gender-segregated groups heightened men's
animosity toward them (Poster and Salime 2002). Another study found
that women Grameen Bank participants did not control the loans they re-
ceived; their husbands or kinsmen took charge of the money and some-
times become violent when their wives or kin were denied loans or refused
to hand over the money (Goetz and Gupta 1996).
Some researchers report that peer groups for lenders can be extremely
oppressive for borrowers who are unable to repay their loans when they
are watched and shunned in the community. In the face of this increased
community surveillance and sanction, some borrowers return to village
loan sharks in order to make microloan payments (Fernando 1997).
Although there are numerous criticisms, MDPs continue to offer hope
of individual and community empowerment in the southern hemisphere.
Studies continue to document many examples of the empowerment effects
of peer lending and economic assistance for women and men in MDPs. In
many programs and communities, individuals struggle to realize the pro-
gressive potential of MDPs. Despite many barriers to localized controls,
northern development organizations do not completely dominate south-
ern MDP operations. Some international funding agencies are supportive
of women's organizing and collective empowerment agendas (Alvarez
1999; Johnson 1999). In addition, some southern hemisphere programs
have successfully negotiated the bureaucratic maze of funder demands to
locate funders more compatible with their goals. On occasion, they suc-
cessfully appropriate and transform MDP models to fit their localized
needs (see Alvarez 2000; Thayer 2001; Poster and Salime 2002).
CONCLUSION
The history of southern hemisphere MDPs reveals innovations, accom-
plishments, and dilemmas. Although U.S. programs are portrayed as an
outgrowth of successful southern hemisphere MDPs, the relationship was
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not that simple. Modern MDPs are embedded in a complex context of
economic crises and change and of accompanying neoliberal ideologies
and policies. Although some MDPs were developed by indigenous leaders
of the countries in which they were begun, northern ideologies and organ-
izations significantly influence the form and scope of southern MDPs.
Programs also vary considerably; some have developed holistic and ac-
tivist agendas (e.g., SEWA), whereas others (e.g., ACCION) have focused
more narrowly on self-employment lending. Efforts to move toward com-
mercialization, favored by USAID, the World Bank, and others, are most
consistent with neoliberal market-centered ideologies. Although these
trends may greatly expand service outputs, they threaten to narrow the
services available to the poor, and most certainly to limit program scope
so that it excludes collective empowerment-oriented agendas.
Some proponents argue that MDPs actually offer a more humane third
way residing between free-market ideologies and the traditional liberal re-
liance on government (Giddens 1998; Schreiner and Morduch 2002). This
third way calls for a greater participation from civic society, including
NGOs, as well as localized nonprofit organizations in the provision of
human services. Regardless of the preference for neoliberal or third-way
ideology, both encourage the privatization of public services and the eval-
uation of even publicly and NGO-provided services in terms of their con-
sistency with businesslike operations standards.
The context of the new economy provided tremendous opportunities
for MDP growth and popularization, but these opportunities also posed
dilemmas. Contradictions arose for southern MDPs in the following areas:
alleviating versus legitimating neoliberal policies, program outreach ver-
sus program sustainability, empowering versus overburdening clients as
individuals, encouraging collective empowerment versus increasing com-
munity surveillance, and facilitating local control in the face of growing
national and international standards. Despite these tensions, reports of
southern program successes provided an important niche or point of ref-
erence for the diffusion of MDPs into the United States during the 1980s
and 1990s.
